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STATE OF UTAH

March 1 ,

1990

Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler
Supreme Court Clerk
332 State Capitol
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114
Re:

Second Citation of New Authority,
Colman v. Utah State Land Board,
Utah Supreme Court No. 860331

MAR 1 1990
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

Dear Mr. B u t l e r :
We submit this letter to the Court in accordance with Rule
24(j) r Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. Our purpose is to cite
and explain a new case on an important issue. That case, which
we just discovered, is Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton Sheep
Co., 776 P.2d 618 (Utah 1989). It was decided after we (the
State Respondents) had filed our Supplemental Brief.
In the court below, Judge Banks granted the Respondents'
respective motions to dismiss, after "having reviewed the entire
file," including the evidence put in the record in connection
with Appellant Colman's motion for preliminary injunction. (See
the State's Supplemental Brief pp. 2-3.)
In our Supplemental Brief (p. 3) we stated: "Judge Banks'
decision is well supported by the record.2" Our footnote 2
addressed Colmanfs request that this Court not consider the
record now before the Court.
We think our "Statement of the Case," pp. 1-7, including
footnote 2, discredits Colman's request. We think law and logic
allow this Court to refer to the full record, as did Judge Banks.
In addition to the precedents and arguments given in our
Supplemental Brief, we now refer the Court to Flying Diamond,
supra, 776 P.2d at 622.
In our Supplemental Brief's footnote 2, we noted that Judge
Banks did not expressly treat this case as one for summary
judgment. For example, he did not make specific findings of
fact. But, as we noted there, Judge Banks did expressly state he
had "reviewed the entire file" before rendering his decision.
The "entire file" included all the record evidence, including
certain dispositive facts that were uncontradicted.
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Flying Diamond notes that generally a trial court errs by
not making findings on all material issuesf and that the matter
usually must be remanded "for the purpose of allowing the trial
court to make such findings." 776 P.2d at 622.
"However, a remand is not necessary if the evidence in the
record is undisputed and the appellate court can fairly and
properly resolve the case on the record before it." Id. (emphasis added).
That precisely is one of the arguments we advanced in our
Supplemental Brief. That rule applies here to obviate a remand
in our case.
The Court decided Flying Diamond without remanding, "[b]ecause the issue * * * [was] controlled entirely by the Agreement
and the wholly undisputed parol evidence * * *." Id.
Our case is similar. If Colman has a protectable property
right in this case, it depends on the lease agreement between
Colman and the State. In our view, the lease eviscerates Colman's case as a matter of law. (See the State's Supplemental
Brief at 38-39; and the State's primary brief at 5 n.lr and pp. "
and 34 n.19.) And the lease is but one of several undisputed,
dispositive items of evidence in the record. The Court can and
should decide this case on the record and as a matter of law.
For a discussion of other undisputed
please refer to the State's briefs. (See
Supplemental Brief at pp. 1-7, 38-39, 46,
and the State's primary brief at pp. 2-6,
34 n.19. )

and dispositive facts,
especially the State's
48 n.32, and 56 n.37;
7, 16, 18-23, 25, and

We respectfully submit that, as a matter of law, Colman has
not stated a claim, and that the Court can decide this case
without requiring the parties to undergo further litigation.

R. DOUGLAS CREDILLE
Assistant Attorney General
RDC/ac
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